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1. Introduction
This paper addresses the following questions from the point of view of 
Nietzsche’s philosophy: what is the mind, and which kind of relationship 
does it hold to the body? Accordingly, the aim of this paper is to show that 
Nietzsche’s philosophy suggested a view of the mind that allows to outline 
an alternative stance to both mentalism and physicalism, as well as to both 
dualism and reductionism. It is argued that Nietzsche’s rehabilitation of 
the body as the specific seat of the mind in opposition to the Cartesian su-
premacy of the Ego still is of great interest for contemporary philosophy, 
because it is not equivalent either to a reversed form of Cartesian dualism 
or to a physicalist reductionism. It is argued that Nietzsche did restrict 
the concept of the mind but in order not to eliminate it, rather to “de-sub-
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stantialise” it. As the body is described as “Leib-Organisation”, the mind 
becomes the course of various manifold mental states that depend on a 
bodily basis. 
It is maintained that these arguments point to a non-reductionist phys-
iologism. Mental states are argued to be not causa sui, in striking contrast 
to the form of dualism that considers the mind to be causally independent 
and separated off from the body. At the same time, mental states are not 
fully reducible to the physiological processes from which they emerge, 
since they are evolutionarily specific.
In this connection a distinction is put forth between conscious and 
unconscious mental states, in order to see how Nietzsche gave a new inter-
pretation of the concept of consciousness by means of it. The conscious-
ness is considered to be neither the unique seat of the cognitive functions, 
nor the mind tout court anymore. Rather, it is argued that unconscious 
mental states with non-conceptual content have to be admitted of existing 
along with conscious mental states, whose content is conceptual instead.
On this ground, it is argued that unconscious mental states constitute 
the dimension of singular perceptions referring to what is such complex, 
fine grained and subtle that it avoids any sort of conceptualization and 
categorization that characterize conscious mental states.
The specification of these unconscious cognitive states allows to 
point out the connection between the mind or, more appropriately, some 
mental activities and the body, that is those sensory organs and physiologi-
cal processes that bring about determinate states which are endowed with 
a physical and yet a mental nature.
2. The Mind and the Body as Leib-Organisation
Nietzsche’s reflections on what is the mind (der Geist) and how cognitive 
functions work are carried out within a bold anticartesian view. Nietzsche 
criticizes the dualistic opposition between the res cogitans (the mind) and 
the res extensa (the body). Furthermore, he raises objections to the suprem-
acy of the subject considered as a conscious mental substantial unity that 
governs human beings and presides over their actions, thought and will.
1
 
1 Cf. JGB 17; Nachlass 1887, KSA 12, 10[158].
For the quotations from Nietzsche’s works, the following abbreviations will be used:
JGB = Jenseits von Gut und Böse;
ZA   = Also Sprach Zarathustra;
WL    = Über Wahrheit und Lüge im aussermoralischen Sinne;
FW    = Die fröhliche Wissenschaft. 
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Nietzsche tries to de-substantialise the subject (“Ich-Geistigkeit”) as well 
as the mind. Accordingly, he talks deliberately of a plurality of subjects 
(“Subjekt-Vielheit”) (JGB, KSA 5, 12; Nachlass 1884–1885, KSA 11, 
40[42]) inside the same individual, since he claims that what we usually 
call the “I” is nothing but the complex and dynamic whole of manifold 
mental states. To Nietzsche, the subject, if construed as a res cogitans, 
correspond to something that does not exist (cf. Nachlass 1887, KSA 12, 
9[98]). In complete contrast with the model of substantialism, Nietzsche 
works out a dynamical model, according to which the human being is like 
a continuous course of intertwined mental and bodily processes, which 
are not dualistically opposed although they differ from one another in the 
functions they play and the degree of complexity they support. To be sure, 
Nietzsche’s view on this subject matter is influenced by the new physiol-
ogy of the nineteenth century, which focused on the relations between 
physic and psychic phenomena. This is the connection of the definition of 
the psychophysics by Theodor Fechner, whose books Über die physiska-
lische und philosophische Atomenlehre (1855) and Elemente der Psycho-
physik (1860) are present in Nietzsche’s own library. One of the main 
theoretical issue of Fechner’s psychophysics is the description of psychic 
phenomena as the inner side of one and the same process, rather than as 
mere transformations of processes in the brain. Accordingly, the psychic 
or mental and the physiological or bodily dimensions are no more consid-
ered as two separate and distinct things, rather as two sides of one and the 
same matter (cf. Nachlass 1885–1887, KSA 12, 5[56]). Furthermore, they 
are just acknowledged as two different degrees of one and the same proc-
ess, since Fechner and his master J. Müller (in his Über das organische 
Leben) refused the traditional idea of substance, be it material or spiritual, 
and instead reasoned in terms of forces and energy that may acquire a sub-
jective, that is psychic, nature according to their intensity. Hence, to Ni-
etzsche the psychophysics, or the psychophysiology as he dubs it, requires 
rejecting the question about the seat of the Soul, since there is no reason 
to conceive of the existence of a specific permanent seat of the conscious-
ness, because its presumed unity rather emerges only from an integrated 
system of dynamic psychophysical processes. In fact, Nietzsche’s interest 
in the psychophysiology arises from the need to couple the physiologi-
cal-bodily dimension to the psychic-mental dimension to emphasize their 
interdependence, rather than reducing either of them to the other one. It 
is this concept of interdependence that justifies the view of Nietzsche’s 
thought as a non-reductionist physiologism.
In “Von den Verächtern des Leibes” Nietzsche defines the body as 
the “grosse Vernunft” and refers to the Self not in Cartesian terms but as 
something that “sucht auch mit den Augen der Sinne” and “horcht auch 
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mit den Ohren des Geistes” (ZA 1, KSA 4). The body is regarded as being 
so complex as to include both the sensory bodily part and the intellective 
part, since it is just their interaction that gives rise to the subjectivity of 
the Self. Hence, it can be argued that Nietzsche meant to rehabilitate the 
body against what he denounced as its “Mißverständnis” just to build a 
more extensive and comprehensive concept of the organic matter as the 
organised and complex unity of manifold bodily and mental activities, by 
means of whose organisation and development the organism is allowed to 
be as such, that is to live.
2
Therefore, it is not possible to prescind from the body, that is the 
physiological dimension, since life develops from within a body by means 
of its physiologic processes. Nonetheless, life is not reduced to physi-
ologic processes, since each body sets the boundaries within which the 
psychic and intellective activities are bound to occur. Consequently, the 
Self amounts to the continuous interaction between and interdependence 
on one another of the physiologic or bodily and the psychic or mental 
characteristics. Indeed, Nietzsche maintains that “das physiologische 
Centrum” is “das psychische Centrum” as well (cf. Nachlass 1885–1887, 
KSA 12, 5[56]).
Therefore, it can be argued that there is no dualistic opposition be-
tween the physiological, bodily dimensions and the psychic, mental di-
mensions. Rather, as it will be shown later, a difference between their 
activities and characteristics has to be acknowledged. The I, the Ego, the 
Self point at a subjective unity that develops from within the body as the 
force, intended as an ever changing activity, that prevails momentarily 
over a multitude of other forces with which it keeps bearing relations (cf. 
Nachlass 1880, KSA 9, 6[70]).
Consequently, Nietzsche replaced the opposition between the body 
and the mind, that is the physiological and the psychic dimensions con-
strued by dualism as two static and monolithic entities, with the continuous 
interaction between different manifold activities, be they characterized as 
physiologic or psychical, bodily or mental, which takes place in one and 
the same body.
The claim is thus justified that Nietzsche’s thought lays bare a non-
reductionist physiologism. A physiologist stance can be ascribed to Ni-
etzsche, because he maintains that it is not possible to prescind from the 
body, that is the physic and physiological basis whence everything else 
stems. At the same time, a non-reductionist stance can be ascribed to 
Nietzsche, because he allows such concepts as the I, the Ego, the Self, the 
2 Rosciglione (2005: 150). Cf. Nachlass 1885–1886, KSA 12, 2[102]; Nachlass 
1884–1885, KSA 11, 40[21].
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subjective unity, and finally mental states to maintain a meaning by being 
however thoroughly changed into new concepts according to a definition 
that depends on a distinctly anti-cartesian interpretation.
The body and the Ego are accounted for as something fluid and dy-
namical, since they both have to be tuned to the environment with which 
they interact by means of manifold activities and their organisation. Men-
tal states are accounted for as what emerges evolutionarily from the “Leib-
Organisation” (cf. Abel 1984: 157–161), that is from the body.
On this ground, to acknowledge that within every individual there is 
necessarily and naturally a physical-physiological basis from which men-
tal states emerge and develop does not imply to surrender uncondition-
ally to some sort of deterministic reductionism, according to which every 
human being must be preordained by its physical features to embody a 
definite type of person.
For instance, Leiter (2001: 294) speaks of “type-facts”, that is physi-
cal facts which inevitably determine and characterise a person nearly as 
much as an unmodifiable mould would, because all her other properties, 
such as her conscious mental states, depend upon them. However, Leiter 
seems not to make clear which nature has to be ascribed to these facts, 
since they are defined at the same time as “physiological“ and as forces 
or unconscious affects. Hence, one is allowed to ask whether these forces 
and unconscious affects have to be considered as mental states or not, and 
in the latter case what tells them from physiological facts.
Rather, Nietzsche’s argument of a natural causal dependence of men-
tal states upon physical states does not imply any support to radical epi-
phenomenalism insofar as mental states would be unable to be causally 
effective. To be sure, Nietzsche sometimes seems to be inclined to deny 
the usefulness of the mind, which seems to be ascribed an almost unneces-
sary role. However in such cases he does refer to the conceptual Cartesian 
construal of the Ego, the subjectivity and the consciousness, according 
to which they are defined as unique, unitary, irreducible substances that 
have nothing to do with the manifold unconscious and conscious mental 
states Nietzsche just appealed to against just that very monolithic view of 
the mind.
Therefore, the rejection of the causa sui argument in favour of what 
Leiter dubs “the naturalistic argument” (ibid.) about the nature of mental 
states can be fully understood only once Nietzsche’s evolutionary stance 
is appropriately taken into account.
According to it, unconscious and conscious mental states are not 
causa sui, since they depend on and emerge from some physical states. At 
the same time, they play an evolutionary role that makes them necessary 
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for human beings’ survival into the environment they happens to be in. 
That naturalistic argument accounts for Nietzsche’s view only if it is not 
narrowed to claim merely the causal dependence of mental states upon 
physical states. This interpretation runs the risk of underestimating this 
evolutional relationship by not paying the due attention to how mental 
states can emerge from physiological states. Undoubtedly, it is not a mat-
ter of direct and mechanistic causation. Rather, a gradual and complex 
process of organisation must be taken into account that takes place just 
within that physical and bodily world defined as “Leib-Organisation”, 
which gives rise to mental states that are different from physical states 
even though neither opposed nor totally reducible to them.
The body is a collection of different manifold activities with various 
degrees of complexity (Leib-Organisation), which are bound to build such 
essential parts of the organism as its nervous system and its brain. In the 
same way, the mind is a collection of different manifold mental states. Ac-
cording to Nietzsche, countless Individual-Geiste do actually exist, whose 
guidance and “Centralisationsapparat” are provided just by the nervous 
system and the brain, which are all instances of the Leib-Organisation (cf. 
Nachlass 1884, KSA 11, 26 [36]).
According to this view, the mind is not opposed to the bodily, physi-
ological, organic states, rather it develops in continuity with them and 
emerges in connection with them. This argument leads Nietzsche to claim 
that the essence of what is called the mind (der Geist) “scheint mir das 
Wesen des Organischen auszumachen”. Mental functions are therefore 
the form in which the physiologic, organic functions can be sublimed (cf. 
Nachlass 1884, KSA 11, 25 [356]; JGB, KSA 5, 230). It is just this new 
definition of the body and the mind in terms of a manifold of continuous 
processes to allow for a choice to obtain that is alternative to the opposi-
tion between dualism and physical reductionism.
3
3. Conscious and Unconscious Mental Phenomena
To Nietzsche, it is not the mind conceived of as the Cartesian res cogitans 
that exists, rather different manifold mental states. Then, which nature 
do they have, and do they have all the same features? Answering these 
questions requires to deal with another conundrum of the contemporary 
philosophical and scientific debate, that is consciousness.
Nietzsche differentiates unconscious mental activities (“Unbewusste 
geistigen Wirken”) from conscious mental ones (cf. Nachlass 1884–1885, 
KSA 11, 40[15]; Nachlass 1888–1889, KSA 13, 14[144]). This is way off 
3 On the Mind-Body problem in Nietzsche, see Schlimgen (1999: 164).
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arguing that the mind, construed as a dynamic collection of manifold men-
tal states, has to be identified with consciousness, as instead in his view 
the Platonic-Cartesian tradition did. 
Nietzsche regards the human being as a complex and stratified entity, 
whose conscious phenomena are only the “End-Erscheinungen”, that is 
the latest but not the most important link of the organic evolutionary chain 
(cf. Nachlass 1885–1887, KSA 12, 7 [1]). According to him, the central 
and peripheral nervous systems are very complex and cannot be reduced 
only to consciousness. He claims that
there is no ground whatever for ascribing to spirit the properties of organiza-
tion and systematization. The nervous system has a much more extensive do-
main; the world of consciousness is added to it. Consciousness plays no role 
in the total process of adaptation and systematization. (Nachlass 1888–1889, 
KSA 13, 14[144])
In fact, Nietzsche’s aim is ascribing a new place to consciousness within 
a wider and more complex domain characterized by a distinctly anti-car-
tesian interpretation.
At a general level, there exists something organic, that is the Body as 
“Leib-Organisation”, the seat of mental phenomena and what they emerge 
from. At a particular level, there exists the mind construed in such a way 
to include both conscious and unconscious phenomena. Since neither a 
unique thinking substance nor a unique bodily substance is given, because 
the human being is the complex collection of manifold organic and (con-
scious and unconscious) mental phenomena, the consciousness must be 
nothing transcendent, that is separated off from and superior to the organic 
and unconscious mental processes.
According to Nietzsche, the consciousness is neither causa sui nor 
finis sui, because it requires different kinds of manifold phenomena that 
bring about because of their complexity the occurrence of conscious men-
tal states but only as one of many equally likely outcomes (cf. Nachlass 
1884–1885, KSA 11, 34[124]). Conscious mental states do not exist for 
their own sake, rather they are part of the evolutionary chain to which 
human beings belong, who on their turn develop to attain the most likely 
equilibrium with the surrounding environment, according to Nietzsche’s 
opinion as well as to an evolutionary and Darwinist view.
In the history of ideas, the Nietzsche–Darwin relationship has given 
rise to a hard debated controversy, also because of the explicit criticism 
Nietzsche addressed to some implications of Darwin’s theory and, above 
all, to Spencer’s interpretation. The Darwinists are charged by Nietzsche 
with overrating the instinct of self-preservation, that which could suggest 
that man is bound to repress his own various potentialities for self-pres-
ervation and also imply the prevalence of “mittleren Typen”, even of “der 
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untermittleren Typen”, over “den höher gerathenen Typen”, “Glücksfäl-
len” (Nachlass 1888, KSA 13, 14[123]). On the other hand, Nietzsche 
blames Darwin for explaining the evolutionary process almost only in 
terms of organisms fitting to the environment. On this ground, Nietzsche 
was inclined rather to adopt the biological theory of the self-regulation, 
which was formulated by the anatomist and biologist Wilhelm Roux (cf. 
Roux 1881). Roux acknowledged that the organism plays a role in the 
inner organisation and the subsequent new arrangement of the material 
incoming from the environment. Therefore, evolution is not limited to a 
fitting function.
However, this criticism does not bar Nietzsche from accepting Dar-
win’s paradigm. Rather, it is in connection with Darwin’s theory that he 
works up his own theory of self-regulation.
4
As far as consciousness is concerned, Nietzsche argues that conscious 
mental states are part of the evolutionary chain, and consequently they 
are supposed to contribute to the man-environment equilibrium that al-
lows man to survive and to preserve himself (cf. Nachlass 1885–1887, 
KSA 12, 2[95]). It is just this evolutionary explanation that justifies the 
naturalization of consciousness, whose role is narrowed in comparison 
with that played by the body and by unconscious mental states, but not to 
such an extent that it would be deprived of any evolutionary usefulness. 
Consciousness is what allows the body to achieve perfection by facilitat-
ing and satisfying its natural organic finality (cf. Nachlass 1884, KSA 10, 
24[16]).
It can be argued that the interpretation of Nietzsche’s thought risks 
of underestimating this evolutionary account, if it is limited only to the 
criticism against the Platonic-Cartesian model of consciousness, which 
is accused of concealing the humble features of the body along with its 
instincts and unconscious processes. In fact, Nietzsche’s theory could be 
a promising starting point for a non-reductionist physiologism to provide 
a solution of the Mind-Body problem as well as of the problem of con-
sciousness.
To appreciate Nietzsche’s view, it is worth quoting Gerard Edelman 
who claims that
an adequate theory of consciousness based on brain structure and function 
must be an evolutionary theory that is consistent with the principles of de-
velopment. If we assume (as any such theory must) that the consciousness 
arose as a result of evolutionary processes affecting brain structures, we will 
4 For Nietzsche–Darwin and Nietzsche–Roux relations see: Müller-Lauter (1978); 
Salaquarda (1978); Mostert (1979); Smith (1987); Stegmeier (1987); Richardson (2002).
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not find it likely that such processes emerged precipitously […]. (Edelman 
1989: 11)
It is worth noticing that Damasio’s theory, which is a prominent theory in 
the contemporary debate on the Mind-Body problem, resembles a kind of 
approach Nietzsche could have been taken to hold. Damasio takes Edel-
man’s work into account and founds his theory on the evolutionary expla-
nation of the origin of consciousness. According to him, the consciousness 
is “a device capable of maximizing the effective manipulation of images 
in the service of the interests of a particular organism”, which by means 
of this very feature “would probably have prevailed in evolution”, since 
the “survival in a complex environment, that is, efficient management of 
life regulation, depends on taking the right action, and that, in turn, can be 
greatly improved by purposeful preview and manipulation of images in 
mind and optimal plannig” (Damasio 1994: 24).
In the same way, to Nietzsche consciousness does not exhaust the 
domain of knowledge, rather it only provides schemes in the form of con-
cepts and categories that simplify the sense-data manifold, the sensory 
individuality and difference. As Nietzsche states in the aphorism 354 of 
Die fröhliche Wissenschaft, the consciousness occurs when a thought “in 
Worten geschieht, dass heisst in Mittheilungszeichen” so that “die En-
twicklung der Sprache und die Entwicklung des Bewusstseins Hand in 
Hand gehen” (FW, KSA 3, 354). The function of the consciousness is to 
turn the individual nature of the “Sinneseindrücke” into what Nietzsche 
calls their “Durchschnittliches” (cf. FW, KSA 3, 354), the “Gemein-
schafts- und Heerden-Natur” in which similar things, though different in 
many respects they may be, are reduced to identity by constructing con-
cepts that retain only some common features, which are selected among 
many single representational contents, and remove the distinctive features 
for a successful communication to obtain (ibid.).
A much more dated back work than Die fröhliche Wissenschaft, 
though not so different as to theoretical content, such as Über Wahrheit 
und Lüge im aussermoralischen Sinne, provides us with another example 
of that claim:
Just as it is certain that one leaf is never totally the same as another, so it 
is certain that the concept “leaf” is formed by arbitrarily discarding these 
individual differences and by forgetting the distinguishing aspects. This 
awakens the idea that, in addition to the leaves, there exists in nature the 
“leaf”: the original model according to which all the leaves were perhaps 
woven, sketched, measured, colored, curled, and painted – but by incompe-
tent hands, so that no specimen has turned out to be a correct, trustworthy, 
and faithful likeness of the original model. (WL, KSA 1, 1)
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The concept of the leaf is formed just by discarding the individual differ-
ences, because they are not conceptualizable, that is they fall outside the 
domain of concepts. Hence, on the one hand, Nietzsche suggests a gene-
alogy of concepts, which – according to the aphorism 354 – are a char-
acteristic feature of consciousness that is explained as a function of the 
primordial instinct of self-preservation of men, who must communicate 
with one other in the social dimension for needs of help and protection 
to be met. On the other hand, he denounces the consequence of that con-
ceptualization, that is the thoroughly arbitrary and falsifying claim of the 
existence of primordial forms, for example “the Leaf”, on whose model all 
single leaves are conceived of being formed.
It is reasonable to argue that to Nietzsche the consciousness, that is 
the collection of different conscious mental states, is always conceptual or 
– borrowing this expression from the contemporary philosophical debate 
– has always a conceptual content (see Evans 1992). But since according 
to Nietzsche conscious mental states are only one part of human beings’ 
cognitive activity, it must be supposed that the complement of this activ-
ity, that is the manifold unconscious mental states, has a non-conceptual 
content.
It is no coincidence that in Die fröhliche Wissenschaft Nietzsche 
claims that consciousness is only an accidental feature of representation 
(Vorstellung), contending that Leibniz was the first to raise this claim (cf. 
FW, KSA 3, 357). This implies that the range of our mental representa-
tions does not coincide with consciousness, and that mental representa-
tions do not possess only a conceptual content, as McDowell would have 
it.
5
 Actually, Nietzsche holds that there are such too fine grained and sub-
tle aspects of the world that cannot be represented by any conceptual and 
abstract semantic structure.
On the ground of this argument, Nietzsche’s theory can have signifi-
cant implications for the contemporary debate about the mind, the con-
sciousness and the structure of their content.
Katsafanas (2005) claims that in Nietzsche’s thought, conceptual fea-
tures are the main characteristic of consciousness, while non-conceptual 
features are the main characteristic of unconscious states. However, he 
seems to dwell too little upon the fact that the fine grained and rich nature 
of contents is what makes the content of many unconscious states non-
conceptual. According to Nietzsche, it is just that fine grained and rich 
character of contents that enables them to elude any form of classifica-
tion. As Katsafanas construes Nietzsche’s thought, every mental state can 
be either conscious or unconscious, since the same perceptual experience 
5 Cf. McDowell (1996). Nachlass 1887–1889, KSA 13, 11[145].
53C. ROSCIGLIONE: A Non-Reductionist Physiologism 
might turn from being unconscious or non-conceptual into being con-
scious or conceptual, as soon as it is given a structure by expressible con-
cepts and then articulated into words. However, some objections can be 
raised against the view that the content of conscious mental states could be 
the same as that of unconscious states under the assumption that the only 
difference is provided by the conceptualization of consciousness. The spe-
cific feature of the content of unconscious mental states is just being so 
rich, fine grained and subtle that it escapes any form of conceptualization. 
If it can be said that we perceive a particular green shade only at a non-
conceptual level, because this perceptual content is too fine grained and 
subtle, then it is not possible for it to be also the content of a conceptual 
experience, just because it is not liable to conceptualization. And if we try 
to conceptualize it by recording it into the categories of “bottle-green” or 
“olive-green” colour, we are going to simplify it or, as Nietzsche would 
put it, falsifying it somehow, betraying its being such and such a rich in-
dividual perception.
In the same way, Evans (1992: 122, 154) reasoned that there is such 
a fine grained level of the world that it eludes concepts, notwithstand-
ing that it can be perceived in a non-conceptual way. Accordingly, Evans 
argued for the existence of a non-conceptual content, suggesting that our 
cognition is such to have a representational content that however is not 
conceptualizable.
Otherwise, McDowell defends the view that an experience endowed 
with a non-conceptual content could never constitute a true cognitive activ-
ity, since experience must always have a conceptual content. He reasoned 
that the fine grained features of, for instance, perceptual colour experi-
ences can be accommodated by the recourse to demonstratives, which is 
grounded onto the occurrence of the individual colour sample to which 
we can always refer by such an expression as “that shade” (McDowell 
1996: 57–58). Were that not the case, the experience would not be such at 
all, rather it narrows only to a blind intuition that would prove thoroughly 
useless for cognition (1996: 54–56). McDowell concedes that there could 
be concepts that show to have different degrees of determination, but they 
are still to be recognized as concepts.
Instead, it can be supposed that Nietzsche would have not accepted 
this argument. To him the concept as such has a simplifying function that 
is satisfied by removing the distinguishing features, that is the individual 
and unrepeatable particularities. Therefore, concepts cannot even retain 
the fine grained and individual characters of the intuitive impressions that 
qualify to be considered non-conceptual.
Nietzsche’s theory can be construed to agree with the criticism Crane 
addressed to the notion of conceptual content that is proposed by McDow-
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ell. Crane claims that McDowell takes the conceptual content to be the 
same as the linguistic content, so that the distinction between conceptual 
and non-conceptual contents would depend on having a language or not. 
On the contrary, Crane argues that it is possible to have a concept of X 
without having the related linguistic structure, rather merely having only 
an idea that individuates that kind of X. That being the case, McDowell’s 
argument that the green shade is conceptually graspable by referring to 
it as “that shade” derives from the fallacy of identifying conceptual and 
linguistic contents. “That shade” is only a linguistic expression that does 
not possess any of those properties one can ascribe to a concept, such as 
being suitable for inference, being recalled or imaged as that particular 
content and becoming an argument of reasoning once its experience is 
gone. According to Crane, the “that shade” expression does not allow to 
accommodate and reprocess the content it refers to except when a subject 
is presented with it. Therefore, a “that–” expression is not conceptual and 
accordingly it does not imply that the experience of that particular green 
shade falls under the conceptual domain (Crane 2001: 152–155).
In Über Wahrheit und Lüge im aussermoralischen Sinne Nietzsche’s 
considerations about what he calls the “plötzliche Eindrücke” and the “in-
tuitive metaphors” might be considered as suggesting the existence of un-
conscious perceptual cognitive states. Nietzsche claims that these intuitive 
metaphors are individual. Therefore they elude any form of recording or, 
literally, of registering into a repertoire (“Rubricieren”) that is conceptual 
and shows to have a “starre Regelmässigkeit”, a “Kastenordnung” and the 
“Reihenfolgen der Rangklasse” (WL, KSA 1, 1).
Nietzsche often refers to the consciousness as something to which the 
instinct is opposed. He suggests that the consciousness is made of trials, 
mistakes, fatigue, while the instinct realizes the perfection, the thorough 
naturalness of an action (see Nachlass 1888, KSA 13, 15[25]). Nietzsche 
seems to use elsewhere similar words for the unconscious that takes part 
in “jeder Art Vollkommenheit”, as it does in the case of the perfect math-
ematician who “seine Kombinationen unbewusst handhabt …” (Nachlass 
1888, KSA 13, 14[111]).
According to these claims, conscious states are simply such states 
through which the subject learns something as the war craft for soldiers, the 
combination of symbols for mathematicians, the driving skills for young 
men. During her learning the subject cannot but pay attention to what she 
does every time she does it, making errors and learning hardly from her 
own mistakes. However, when she achieves a perfect learning, she will act 
without thinking about it, unconsciously or instinctively. Then the uncon-
scious should be intended as something like an automatic process which 
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cannot take place were it not preceded by such learning by means of trial 
and errors, which is described by Nietzsche as the “Bewusstwerden”.
Unconscious states stem from conscious and attention driven states, 
but they are also always able to change into conscious states as soon as 
what is done in an automatic and instinctive way changes from being im-
plicit into being explicit.
It is necessary to emphasize that this kind of the unconscious has 
nothing to do with the unconscious mental activities that Nietzsche sin-
gles out at a mainly perceptual level, which elude any form of conscious 
conceptualization and categorization because of their individual and sub-
tle characteristics (cf. Nachlass 1887–1888, KSA 13, 11[113]; Nachlass 
1885–1886, KSA 12, 2 [95]). In that case it is not a matter of either in-
ternalizing something by learning until it becomes automatic or making 
explicit something that was implicit as it could be the case with the gram-
matical rules.
For instance, in JGB 20 Nietzsche refers to the “grammatischen 
Funktionen” as “unbewusste Herrschaft und Führung”, that is just some-
thing implicit which becomes conscious as soon as it is made explicit, for 
example, in grammar textbooks in which some experts, i.e. the grammar-
ians, state explicitly the rules and the structures every subject implicitly 
complies with without the need of being aware of them. This kind of cases 
qualifies as the only one for which Anderson’s (2005) interpretation could 
be accepted, according to which to Nietzsche concepts are unconscious in 
the same way the grammatical functions are.
However this interpretation can not overlook that there are some inner 
and outer perceptions that could never be the content of conscious states 
since they are not conceptualizable and linguistically communicable. And 
the fact that these perceptions are not to be selected by any conscious 
mental activity does not imply their inexistence. They do exist, although 
at a non-conceptual unconscious mental level.
Nietzsche’s theory of knowledge allows for a non-conceptual percep-
tual level. If reference is made again to the aphorism 375 in Die fröhliche 
Wissenschaft, it is possible to argue that the view that consciousness is 
only an accident of representations means to acknowledge the existence 
of unconscious representations, that is of mental states that have a con-
tent, which make them representations, although they must be qualified as 
unconscious for the non-conceptual characteristics of their content. This 
argument implies that perception, which is mainly an unconscious repre-
sentation, is necessarily requested for cognitive processes to obtain (cf. 
FW, KSA 3, 333).
As far as this issue is concerned, Anderson (2005) goes as far as argu-
ing for a “Nietzsche’s sensualism”, by claiming that Nietzsche’s theory of 
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knowledge acknowledges priority to the “unconscious sensory intuitions” 
that grasp the rich and fine grained nature of sensory matter, which other-
wise just because of these two characteristics would be out of reach for 
conscious experience, whose content turns out to be an incomplete and 
limited rearrangement of what nevertheless experience attains by means 
of the sensory intuitions themselves.
In conclusion, not only the mind is construed no more as the Cartesian 
res cogitans, but also mental states cannot be said to share all the same 
characteristic features. In fact, there exist either unconscious or conscious 
mental states. The unconscious mental states have a non-conceptual con-
tent and are not liable to conceptualization because of the fine grained and 
subtle characteristics of this content. Instead, the conscious mental states 
have a conceptual content, since their function is to simplify and catego-
rize. As a consequence, the manifold unconscious mental states are not 
reducible to conscious states.
4. Some Implications on Mind, Body and Consciousness
The argument – which was expounded in the above section – of a second-
ary cognitive role, which is played by consciousness by means of categori-
zation and conceptualization, provides with a ground to consider the mind 
as something complex that consists in different layers, which is neither 
reduced to conscious mental states alone nor dualistically opposed to the 
physiological processes of the body. The way the body develops, as in the 
case of sensory organs, is a determining condition for the emergence of 
the unconscious perceptual processes with a non-conceptual content. This 
argument provided Nietzsche with reason to maintain that it is “wesentlich 
vom Leibe ausgehen und ihn als Leitfaden zu benutzen” (Nachlass 1885, 
KSA 11, 40[15]). It is by means of the body that man can bring about a 
correct representation of the nature of subjective unity, which is actually 
nothing but a plurality of elements that follow one another continuously 
to guide the organism, which accordingly have all the same value for car-
rying out its functions.
The body is the starting point to understand that these “lebendigen 
Einheiten entstehen und sterben und wie zum ‘Subjekt’ nicht Ewigkeit 
gehört” (Nachlass 1885, KSA 11, 40[21]). If man paid the due attention to 
the body, he would likely become aware of the precariousness of his con-
dition, because the conceptual and thought development of the intellect 
and the consciousness ends up to be founded onto the organic activities 
and affects, which are “eine Vielheit, hinter der es nicht nötig ist eine Ein-
heit anzusetzen” (Nachlass 1884, KSA 11, 26[36]). That unity discloses 
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as consciousness only afterwards, because it is something man needs for 
evolutionary reasons to simplify, unify and give experience an order.
Therefore, it is reasonable to characterize Nietzsche’s theory as a 
physiologistic approach that puts aside abstract theoretical speculations 
and moves instead from human sensory organs, whose real working and 
functions provide as many as guidelines to investigate cognition. Ni-
etzsche’s non-reductionist physiologism requires a new view of the mind, 
according to which consciousness is supposed to play no longer a privi-
leged cognitive role, allowing thus other activities, mainly of perceptual 
nature, to bring about cognition that develops without the need of being 
unified and homologated by a presumptive superior entity.
Furthermore, these activities emerge from and are founded on de-
terminate physiologic processes, which are bounded to take place into 
specific bodily structures. As Nietzsche emphasizes becoming and com-
plexity, both conscious and unconscious mental states do not have to be 
construed as something substantially different from the physiologic bodily 
processes. They are one of the outcomes of the activities that occur in the 
body itself. Indeed, Nietzsche maintains that the “Ich-Geistige selber” is 
given just when the cells are (see Nachlass 1884, KSA 11, 26[36]).
Nietzsche can be taken to point out that what Searle dubbed the “mys-
tery of consciousness“ has to be dissolved,
6
 since there is no thing to be 
called “consciousness”, whose conceptual content is alleged to meet the 
requirement to be true or to conform to the reality itself. Rather there 
are manifold mental states whose content is conceptual, if they satisfy 
the function to simplify and categorize the things that are present in the 
world.
On this issue, a remark can be considered worthwhile on some points 
of Nietzsche’s thought that could prove useful to contemporary debate. 
If consciousness is supposed to dissolve, that is true to Nietzsche’s view 
only as far the Platonic-Cartesian model of consciousness is concerned. 
According to it, consciousness is construed as a unitary substance that 
grasps the reality in itself, but at the cost of denying the perspectivist na-
ture of knowledge. Then it is crucial not to overlook what this dissolution 
comes to preserve. Consciousness turns out to be composed of series of 
conscious mental states endowed with the evolutionary function of creat-
ing concepts and words by which we give our knowledge of the surround-
ing world an order. Furthermore, these conscious states emerge through a 
continuous process from sensory impressions that are individual and non-
6 See Searle (1999: 201). Therefore, to Searle, we would be not facing an unavoidable 
metaphysical hindrance. 
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conceptual, which develop according to determinate sense organs, that is 
on the ground of determinate structures of the body.
In this regard, Nietzsche speaks of a “Verkennung des Bewusstseins” 
that coincides with its “lächerlicher Überschätzung” (cf. FW, KSA 3, 
11). The use of the term “Verkennung” to refer to consciousness gives 
a reason to think that Nietzsche would accept a distinction between the 
consciousness (Bewusstsein) that is a natural outcome of the evolution-
ary development of human beings, and its misinterpretation as the “kern 
des Menschen: sein Bleibendes, Ewiges, Letztes, Ursprünglichstes”. Ni-
etzsche calls “Bewusstheit” this misinterpreted consciousness, and takes 
it to be the cause of conceptual mistakes.
Nietzsche’s reference to consciousness either as “Bewusstsein” or 
“Bewusstheit” proves his intention to draw a distinction between what 
belongs by nature to a definite type of living being, which has the function 
of improving the fitness to the environment together with other peculiar 
processes and activities of different nature, and its degeneration. The latter 
is just the concept of consciousness as a pretended unity of the organism, 
which cause to make erroneous assumptions on its being the organism’s 
primary and highest level function.
Instead, it is possible to provide a new definition of consciousness 
as the series of conscious mental states that are not opposed either to the 
unconscious mental states or to the physiological bodily phenomena.
The claim for unconscious mental states in Nietzsche’s philosophy 
can give a contribution to a theory that considers the mind as something 
strictly tied to the sentience and the body. Indeed, to allow for represen-
tations that do not need to be conscious and conceptual means to recog-
nize an embodied rationality that is not restricted to the intellect, which 
conceptualizes and categorizes, rather displays the feature of individual-
ity that is a distinguishing feature of the non-conceptual and unconscious 
perceptions.
This anti-dualistic and anti-reductionist coupling of the body and the 
mind becomes part of the definition of an enriched relationship between 
man and nature, man and world, according to which human beings play no 
longer the privileged role of dominating the nature. To be sure, they keep 
on being held to possess concepts and languages that differentiate them 
from other living beings, by which they organize themselves into societies 
to gain self-preservation. However, these characteristics remain construc-
tions that do not affect, or at least only to a limited extent, the course and 
development of the nature man is part of and interacts with along with 
many other elements, being thus not able to control it. Since nature eludes 
any simplification or schematization because of its fine grained structure 
and the complexity of its behaviour.
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In conclusion, a model that emphasizes the features of organization 
and complexity, which is thought of by Nietzsche in terms of “Leib-Or-
ganisation”, could be very promising to account for the relation between 
the mind and the body and, within the mind itself, between conscious and 
unconscious mental states without resigning to the reductionism as it were 
our only reasonable choice.
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